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Whistleblower subjectivities: organization and passionate attachment 
Abstract
What is the nature of whistleblower subjectivity? In this article, we depart from 
current scholarly depictions of this figure as a fearless truth-teller who is fully 
independent of the organization. We argue for a new framing that sees the self-
construction of the whistleblower as infused with passionate attachments to 
organizational and professional norms, even after one experiences severe reprisals. 
We base our claims on recently-gathered empirical data and draw on Judith Butler to 
theorize how, contrary to existing understandings, passionate attachments to one’s 
organization and profession shape whistleblower subjectivity, rather than conscious 
risk-taking, or autonomous self-reinvention. Our second contribution is to highlight 
the importance of practical and material supports for this vital figure in society; until 
now the whistleblower has been idealized as an extraordinary hero rather than a real 
human in need of assistance. Overall, we propose a new theorization of the 
whistleblower involving passionate investments in the organization or profession that 
has cast one out.   




Whistleblowing is most frequently described as an employee’s ‘disclosure of illegal, 
immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action’ (Miceli, Near & Dworkin, 2008, p. 6), 
for others it is an act of ‘speaking truth to power’ (Munro, 2017). In a world in which 
wrongdoing is rife within public and private organizations, whistleblowers have 
exposed financial fraud, public health threats, and dangerous working conditions. Yet 
little is known about whistleblowers themselves and how they make sense of their 
positions (Contu, 2014; de George, 2010; Hoffman & Schwartz, 2014). Instead, 
stereotypes abound; whistleblowers are regarded as heroes and saints by some, and as 
traitors and villains by others (Grant, 2002; Hersch, 2002). Given this lacuna, and the 
ambivalence with which this vital figure is often perceived, new approaches both 
theoretical and practical are essential.  
Studies of organizational whistleblowing typically adopt a quantitative, positivist 
approach to ‘profiling’ whistleblowing, attempting for example to understand the 
variables that will lead to greater likelihood of people speaking out, achieving impact, 
or suffering reprisal (Martin & Rifkin 2004; Miceli et al., 2008). This article 
addresses another, smaller stream of research that aims to understand the subjectivity 
of the whistleblower and typically adopts a Foucauldian perspective to do so (Alford, 
2001). The idea is that the whistleblower subject is constructed amid a network of 
historical, cultural and institutional discourses (Perry, 1998). Recently scholars have 
drawn on Foucault’s reading of the concept of parrhesia -- fearless speech -- from 
Ancient Greece (Foucault, 2006, 2010; see also Vandekerckhove & Langenberg, 
2012), to understand whistleblowing as one such instance. The subjectivity of the 
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whistleblower emerges through the process of speaking freely to articulate one’s 
truth, even where this means challenging those more powerful than oneself. What 
tends to be overlooked is the question of how whistleblower subjectivity is formed 
and how attachments shape this process; instead whistleblower subjectivity is 
depicted as being founded upon a deliberate decision to risk one’s own livelihood 
through a singular action emerging from one’s own desire, that is, as free of 
attachments.  
In this article, we interrogate this position. Our goal is to examine in-depth the 
shaping of the whistleblower’s subjectivity, the positions adopted and the role of the 
organization. As others note, the whistleblower is not a pre-existing entity but rather 
emerges as an ethical subject through the practice of speaking out (Weiskopf & 
Willmott, 2013). We develop this idea further to show that one’s construction of 
oneself as whistleblower is not merely bound up in the specific discursive and 
circumstantial context but that it is an affective phenomenon inscribed by the 
employee’s passionate attachment to organizational ideals and professional norms. 
We draw our inspiration from Judith Butler’s work to offer novel theoretical 
contributions on speaking up in organizations. Our contributions are primarily to 
literature on whistleblowing and secondarily to debates on parrhesia within this. 
Specifically, we illuminate constructions of whistleblower subjectivity as these take 
place during interview interactions, showing that these are structured neither around 
risk-taking, nor a free and independent reinvention of self, but are founded on 
passionate investments in organizational and professional ideals. This suggests a new 
way to theorize organizational whistleblowing that encompasses affective 
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identifications with the very organizations and professions that have excluded the 
discloser. 
The article proceeds with an overview of relevant literature on organizational 
whistleblowing before describing in-depth our methodological approach. This is 
followed by detailed description and analysis of whistleblowers’ accounts, and a 
discussion of how these relate to existing literature. We conclude by developing an 
alternative conception of the organizational whistleblower and detail the emerging 
theoretical and practical implications.  
Whistleblowing subjects 
How are whistleblower subjectivities currently understood? In Alford’s (2001) 
influential work, whistleblowers’ accounts of themselves depict resistant subjects, 
each spurred into action by a personal and irresistible drive to correct a perceived 
wrongdoing. Similarly drawing on Foucault, and building on Alford’s ideas, recent 
organizational scholarship views the whistleblower subject as constituted through a 
process of parrhesiastic truth-telling (Andrade, 2015; Jack, 2004; Contu, 2014; 
Mansbach, 2009; Rothschild, 2013; Vandekerckhove & Langenberg, 2012; 
Vandekerckhove, 2006; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016). This involves 
articulating the plain truth as one sees it because of a specific ‘relation to truth 
through frankness’ and ‘moral law through freedom and duty’, which one holds 
(Foucault, 2001, p. 19; 2005, see also Jones, Parker & ten Bos, 2005; Mansbach, 
2009; Rothschild, 2013). The whistleblower is positioned as a subject morally obliged 
to act, by for example speaking out against organizational wrongdoing (Jack, 2004, p. 
130; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 652). This positioning as parrhesiastes 
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enables one to reject ‘the security of a life where the truth goes unspoken’; instead the 
whistleblower forges a relation to himself as a truth-teller through a ‘pact… with 
himself’ (Mansbach, 2009; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 658). Constructing 
oneself in this way is part of the ‘ethico-political practice that opens up possibilities of 
new ways of relating to the self and others (the ethical dimension) and new ways of 
organizing relations to others (the political dimension)’ that whistleblowing-as-
parrhesia involves (Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 650). Parrhesia thus offers 
a useful way of positioning oneself and one’s actions, as whistleblower. 
This perception of whistleblowing subjectivity is compelling because it offers an 
alternative to other, more ambiguous and at times disparaging, depictions of 
whistleblowers (Andrade, 2015; Jones, Parker & ten Bos, 2005; Mansbach, 2009). In 
place of this contradictory identity, where whistleblowers are seen both as heroes and 
traitors, the parrhesiastic whistleblower subject is based on ‘an act of integrity’ 
(Rothschild, 2013, p. 656). Such a framing also sees the whistleblowing subject as 
political because they have engaged in speaking truth from a relatively powerless 
position in order to disrupt the status quo and effect change (Contu, 2014; Mansbach, 
2009; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 650), as Weiskopf and Willmott (2013) 
show in their discussion of Daniel Ellsberg’s attempts to speak out about the U.S. 
government’s involvement in the Vietnam war. Finally, risk is an important aspect of 
this framing (Contu, 2014; Mansbach, 2009; Rothschild, 2013). Whistleblower 
subjectivity is depicted as involving full awareness of the dangers of speaking out for 
one’s wellbeing (Andrade, 2015; Jack, 2004; Mansbach, 2011; Weiskopf & Tobias-
Miersch, 2016; Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013, p. 483), and speaking up regardless 
(Foucault, 2001, p.19; Foucault, 2010). These risks emerge from the type of criticism 
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typical of parrhesiastic challenge: a relatively weak actor speaking truth to a more 
powerful one. 
Yet these theorizations raise questions about the precise role of the organization in the 
self-constitution of organizational whistleblower-parrhesiastes. Despite having 
received scant attention in the literature to date, some ideas emerge. First, discourses 
of professionalism can influence. Drawing on Foucault, Weiskopf and Tobias-
Miersch (2016) for example show how organizational whistleblowers make use of 
methods of ‘tekhne’: formal rules and obligations, by describing how well-known 
discloser Guido Strack drew on ‘expert knowledge’ of the often contradictory 
discursive frames of bureaucracy and economics, when he critiqued the European 
Union for ‘wasting taxpayer money’ (ibid., p. 661). The subject position that enabled 
him to continue was one of ‘legal professional’ as well as that of a truth-teller (see 
also Mansbach, 2009). Observing this, the authors call for further work on the ways in 
which organizations influence whistleblowing-as-parrhesia (Weiskopf & Tobias-
Miersch, 2016, p. 652).  
A second idea implies that the construction of whistleblower subjectivity is premised 
upon a radical break from the organization and an apparent re-invention of the self 
(Mansbach, 2009, Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 658). Mansbach (2011) for 
example describes the ‘re-identification that [organizational] whistleblowers undergo 
as they travel through the process of the disclosure, from its initial uncertainties and 
subsequent upshot to the re-appropriation of speech that the act of whistleblowing 
enables’ (ibid., p. 12). Yet existing interpretations remain vague on the precise nature 
of this ‘re-identification’, specifically in relation to the freedom or otherwise of the 
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truth-telling subject. Thus, for Weiskopf and Tobias-Miersch, Guido Strack speaks 
freely in his ‘own name’ (2016, p. 656) and in doing so, adopts a position of truth-
teller that breaks from the discursive frames that surround him. He constitutes himself 
as an ethical subject who, through a pact with himself, ‘voluntarily follow[s] his 
personal sense of moral duty’ (Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 658). Contu 
draws upon the Lacanian concept of ‘pure desire’ to understand whistleblower 
subjectivity as premised on a ‘singular’ act that is free from symbolic authority (2014, 
p. 399; see also Mansbach, 2009). This echoes other analyses in which freedom is 
emphasized; for Grant (2002), the subject of whistleblower evokes a ‘single-
mindedness through which the issue is posed with such crystal clarity… that there is 
no question abut what must be done… They are different’ (p. 398). Meanwhile Alford 
(2001, p.76) describes those he studies as ‘true individuals’. Under this view, 
whistleblower subjectivity is marked by a position of freedom. The subject is 
positioned as unattached, unencumbered by social constraints including those relating 
to one’s organization.  
Under this view whistleblower subjectivity is founded on a radical break from the 
organization that has previously dominated, and in many cases retaliated against one. 
A sense of distance from the corrupt former employer is evoked, alongside: ‘a 
magnified sense of their own integrity [and] a new political identity’ (Rothschild, 
2013, p. 647, see also Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013, p. 471). In summary, while the 
construction of whistleblower subjectivity is understood to be shaped by social norms, 
it is predominantly seen as evoking a position of freedom including a radical break 
from the whistleblower’s organization. Yet such approaches disregard attachments to 
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one’s organization and how whistleblowers conceive of themselves as defenders of 
professional norms, as this article will demonstrate.   
Scholars who make these claims on behalf of organizational whistleblowers typically 
draw on secondary accounts of famous truth-tellers, or abstract theorizing that is 
rarely based on empirical work. While this is understandable because of the inevitable 
difficulty in researching whistleblowing ‘in practice’, it is nonetheless surprising 
because as with parrhesia, whistleblowing is, at its core, an ‘everyday embodied 
practice’ (Jack, 2004, pp. 1221-34). In contrast, drawing on recently-gathered 
empirical studies allows us to interrogate the constitution of subjectivity on the part of 
whistleblowers, and to respond to recent calls for developing a more nuanced 
conception (Contu, 2014; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016). Specifically, we 
develop and expand our understanding of whistleblower subjectivity, finding it to be 
deeply embedded in organizational attachments that are not easy to shake off, and we 
find Judith Butler’s concept of passionate attachment to be helpful in theorizing this. 
Theoretical framework  
Judith Butler’s project valuably takes forward Foucault’s concept of subjectivity as 
constituted within, and constituting, discourse (Hall, 2000, p. 28), and therefore is 
appropriate in this context. In exploring the dynamics by which subjects are 
positioned amid discourse and asking what happens in the moment of subjection, she 
draws upon Hegelian philosophy and the psychoanalytic ideas of Jacques Lacan to 
develop a theory of subjectivity. Psychic processes of desire lead to identifications 
with given social norms (Butler, 1997), which are both suffused with affect, and allow 
us to be recognized as a legitimate subject. Inspired by Lacan’s idea of psychic 
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development as a continuous search for unattainable unity by the human subject 
(Fotaki, 2010, 2009), she describes how people striving to overcome a felt alienation 
subjectify themselves to the norms, laws, rituals and language governing their social 
world (‘the symbolic order’), in order to acquire an illusory sense of stable identity.  
For Butler, we have no choice but to seek recognition in this manner, through 
discourse but also through affective attachments to norms and values, because we 
require recognition to exist socially, that is, to occupy a stable place within the 
symbolic order. The subject ‘responds to reflections of itself in emotional ways, 
according to whether that reflection signifies a diminution or augmentation of its own 
possibility of future persistence and life’ (Butler, 2004, p. 235). ‘Passion and grief and 
rage’ mark our experiences of being torn from ourselves and bound to others, and this 
‘implicate(s) us in lives that are not our own, sometimes fatally, irreversibly’ (ibid., p. 
20). We depend on the others we encounter for the normative recognition we so desire 
(Butler, 2004; see Kenny, 2010, 2016; Riach, Rumens & Tyler, 2014 for 
organizational examples): although the symbolic order is the domain of language, the 
ability to confer recognition lies with the diffuse network of others, whose ongoing 
practices of subjection maintain it in place. This dependency, or interdependency, 
expresses itself as attachments that are experienced as affective, or ‘passionate’.  
Butler thus extends Foucault’s work on discursive power by describing such desire-
driven affective attachments to others as the bearers of this order. Failure to attain 
recognition can be experienced as hurtful or even catastrophic for one’s sense of self. 
If we cannot be recognized as legitimate human beings in the terms offered to us by 
such symbolic norms, or if we fall outside of these, then ‘we are not possible beings; 
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we have been foreclosed from possibility’ (Butler, 2004, p. 31). This plunges us into 
an existential crisis, and we therefore work hard to avoid this situation, sometimes 
adhering to subject positions that hurt us (Butler, 1990).  
Theories emphasizing emotions are frequently critiqued from a poststructuralist, 
Foucauldian standpoint because they focus on the sovereign autonomous self who 
‘feels’, rather than the individual subject’s location amid discourses of power, but this 
is not the case here. Rather, Butler’s affects are distinguished from emotions and 
relate to unconscious psychic dynamics of the body’s desire to be (Komporozos-
Athanasiou, Thompson & Fotaki; Fotaki, Kenny & Vachhani, 2017). They are 
expressed as the ‘force’ that fuels the ‘form’ of subjective attachment to discourse 
(Kenny & Gilmore, 2014, p. 166; Parker, 2005; Hook, 2007). Such insights enrich 
Foucault’s work on subjectification to power, which tends to actively downplay and 
in some cases, ignore issues of passion and emotion (Jameson, 1984). Butler’s work 
illuminates how affective forces contribute to the reproduction of discursive norms 
and how individual subjectivities are thereby constituted. These ideas help us to make 
sense of the empirical data we gathered on whistleblower subjectivities and how, for 
example, they are shaped by organizational and professional norms that appear to 
persist against all odds, concomitantly causing pain even as they engender attachment. 
Methods 
Data collection
All three researchers have experience in in-depth studies of whistleblowing. Our 
study draws upon thirty unique cases of whistleblowing in a variety of sectors, 
originating from two different research projects carried out by the first and second 
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authors jointly and individually over a period of five years (Table 1). Both projects 
had adopted a qualitative and interpretive approach, used a similar interview protocol, 
and focused on issues of whistleblower subjectivity. We combined the two projects as 
others have done (Reay et al., 2013), because of the similarities therein. All 
participants had engaged in whistleblowing: attempting to speak out about 
misconduct in their organization and trying to compel senior colleagues to act. All 
had experienced retaliation of various kinds from within their organizations and began 
to see themselves and be seen by others as ‘whistleblowers’ (Rothschild, 2013). Study 
1 comprised fifteen incidents of speaking out in the financial sector across Europe and 
the U.S. (author 1), while study 2 examined what makes whistleblowing possible in 
various industries and across countries involving a sample of twenty two (Study 2, 
authors 1 and 2), seven of whom were drawn from Study 1 and interviewed a second 
time. Most participants were selected initially through contacts in whistleblower 
advocacy groups. Where participants were interviewed a second time (Table 1), 
author 2 carried out the research to gain additional insights into their stories. Author 
3’s extensive experience in researching whistleblowing and specific knowledge of 
parrhesiastic whistleblowing further enhanced analysis and interpretation. 
—————— TABLE 1 HERE ——————— 
For each study, secondary information had been gathered on participants’ cases 
including newspaper stories, organizational documents and publicly-available hearing 
transcripts where relevant, prior to meeting them. People’s claims had been verified 
with other whistleblowers, advocacy groups and by checking documentation. 
Interviews focused on experiences of whistleblowing and its aftermath and typically 
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lasted between 1 and 3 hours. Adhering to our institutions’ ethical protocols, we were 
prepared to offer advice on sources of help should participants become distressed.  
Producing analysis
Coming together as a team, our analytic strategy broadly followed the constructivist 
interpretation of grounded theory in which theories are constructed through the ‘past 
and present involvements’ of the researchers with ‘people, perspectives and practices’ 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 9). Following Charmaz, this was complemented by other 
approaches inspired by our chosen poststructuralist and psychoanalytic framework. 
Analysis involved a series of iterative and non-linear phases. Reading and re-reading 
the data, each researcher produced extended memo notes, iterating between data and 
theory to develop ideas (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). Our focus was on an emergent 
concept: that of shifting subjectivities on the part of our whistleblower interviewees. 
This had not been developed in-depth in existing work on whistleblowing much of 
which draws upon secondary accounts. Coming together to discuss this, we noted that 
in each case, people self-identified as whistleblowers but that this was a complex 
position. Inspired by scholars who adopt similar approaches to the constitution of 
subjectivity in organizations (Driver, 2012), in further analyzing the data we paid 
attention to the ways in which people positioned themselves in relation to wider 
discourses, and specifically to how they represented their selves, or the “I” (Harding, 
2008), amid sometimes shifting norms and discourses, to validate their existence 
(Parker, 2005). Recognizing the centrality of paradox for psychoanalytically-informed 
methodologies, we were attentive to emergent findings that appeared contradictory 
initially, highlighting these for discussion. This was important for countering the 
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tendency within academic research to strive for false coherence that is artificially 
imposed (Parker, 2005; see also Driver, 2012; Hook, 2007).
Based on this and our overarching research question, the initial stage of analysis 
involved identifying issues that appeared significant for participants in relation to how 
they linguistically constructed themselves as whistleblower subjects. We then 
compared initial categories across our cases. This involved re-reading the material 
and systematically labelling chunks of text for first level coding. Codes included 
terms such as ‘loyalty’, ‘trust’, ‘values’ and ‘professionalism’. Bringing together 
similar accounts, we highlighted aspects such as ‘surprise upon discovery of the 
wrongdoing’, ‘fear of falling out with colleagues’, ‘protecting the reputation of the 
profession’, ‘organizational retaliation’, ‘being excluded’, and ‘becoming a 
whistleblower’. We reviewed the codes as we progressed and checked for overlaps, 
merging codes or developing new ones. In the end this process yielded five primary 
themes as illustrated in Table 2. We then re-analyzed our findings in light of the 
organizational literature on whistleblowing and turned to theoretical frameworks on 
the psychosocial formation of subjectivity in organizational contexts. People’s 
accounts of what we understood to be their subjectivity in relation to whistleblowing 
were complex, but appeared to involve self-positioning as loyal employees and 
committed professionals who performed their statutory duty, rather than as fearless 
parrhesiastes. Subjectivities appeared to be intertwined with recognition from the 
organization, colleagues and the profession, even as people posited themselves as 
victims of retaliation. Exploring this further yielded sub-themes within each of our 
primary categories, for example it emerged that ‘professionalism’ consisted of an 
adherence to professional rules, a sense of traditional values, and an awareness of 
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one’s own contribution to the professional community. At this point. given the 
significance of individuals’ relations to their organizations, we further refined our 
primary themes to reflect the subject positions apparently adopted by people to 
include (i) professional subject; (ii) outsider; (iii) loyal employee and (iv) involuntary 
discloser (see Table 2 for examples). This allowed us to proceed with our theoretical 
development in relation to the question of how organizational whistleblower 
subjectivities are constructed, post-disclosure. The process proceeded through mutual 
discussion and consideration, feedback from presentation at an academic workshop, 
and inductive tacking back and forth (Charmaz, 2006) between literature on parrhesia 
in organizations and relevant psychosocial and poststructuralist theories including 
Butler’s theory of affective recognition through symbolic discourses and other 
subjects (Butler, 1997), to explain the apparent influence of organizational norms 
rather than self-constructions as free and heroic individuals.    
As researchers, we acknowledge that we are each caught up in relations of power 
involving many disparate aspects of our lives and work (Fotaki & Harding, 2013; 
Gilmore & Kenny, 2015; Pullen, 2006), including notions of authorial authority, as 
we present and dissect experiences of other people (Parker, 2005). In response, we 
attempt to avoid fixing our participants into particular categories (Riach, Rumens & 
Tyler, 2016), through for example including people in developing research 
interpretations (Ellis, 2007), at stakeholder workshops in Belfast, Northern Ireland 
(January 2015) and London, UK (June, 2015). In addition, we acknowledge that 
research interviews are necessarily performative interactions (Butler, 1990), in which 
the subject positions of both researcher and researched are constituted. For example, 
in contacting people for interview we are implicitly contributing to their adoption of 
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the subject position ‘whistleblower’, a position into which they had already been 
placed by advocacy groups, the media and other parties; we sought them out and 
asked them to once again speak from this place. This has effects and rather than 
ignore these, we instead take it as a starting point that shapes our analysis. We 
therefore study the complex and multi-faceted ways in which such a proffered subject 
position is constructed by both participant and researcher in interaction with each 
other.  
When called upon to do so, whistleblowers drew on a variety of discursive subject 
positions. These naturally included positions that did not relate to their organization 
including as family member, person of religious faith, and citizen. These are outside 
the scope of our research focus, but are explored elsewhere in depth (Kenny, Fotaki & 
Scriver, 2018). 
Constructing the whistleblower subject 
We were interested in how people’s subjectivities were shaped by their experiences of 
speaking up in their organizations, the role of the organization in this, and specifically 
how these accounts emerged in the interview setting. We found that a variety of 
positions were invoked, ranging from loyal organizational subject, to involuntary, 
compelled discloser. Our interviewees tended to describe moving back and forth 
between subject positions. These were by no means homogeneous: discursive 
strategies of course differed across participants. However, certain tendencies appear 
to be shared. We are limited in the space available for presenting this rich data and so 
we provide indicative excerpts in what follows, with further examples given in Table 
2. 
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It is interesting that people’s self-articulations rarely included the label 
‘whistleblower’; respondents appeared only to identify with this term after some time 
had passed since their disclosure and subsequent struggle with the organization, and 
even then, only when they had been called ‘whistleblower’ by other parties including 
journalists and authors. Even so, all those interviewed accepted this label, self-
identifying as such. 
——————— TABLE 2———————- 
Professional 
People frequently articulated themselves as having been committed to the ideals of 
the profession in which they worked, a commitment that prompted them to act when 
wrongdoing they perceived threatened this. This position of professional comprised a 
number of features: first was a strong attachment to the profession itself and the rules 
and regulations that govern it. Lauren for example had been an executive vice-
president overseeing fraud investigation at a large U.S. mortgage bank. Fraud was 
widespread across the organization, and when she spoke up about fake documents 
being used to grant customer mortgages, she was dismissed. In response to questions 
about her work at the bank, she described loving her profession, even as she makes 
fun of her own passion for it:  
I accepted the position because fraud was my love… fighting fraud was 
something I loved to do (laughs).  
Ted, who had been director of the UK company contracted to complete a £2 billion 
military telecommunication project for Saudi Arabia’s National Guard on behalf of 
the UK Ministry of Defence, described his assignment as a dream job. In the 
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interview, he explained that it was: ‘Not only the challenge of the job’ that attracted 
him to it, but rather: 
[…] everything that it asked for I had seemingly been trained for … I 
understood all about military communications because I’d been doing it in the 
army for 23 years.  
Previously a respected army officer (a retired colonel-lieutenant) and experienced 
project manager, he realized after some months in the role that he was being asked to 
sign off fraudulent contracts. He refused and reported the case to the Ministry of 
Defence, and after this was singled out and punished. For both Ted and Lauren, this 
position of professional was described as contributing to a sense of incredulity upon 
discovering the fraud that was taking place in their very different organizations. 
Realizing that ‘every employee in the place just about was doing it [engaged in 
mortgage fraud]’, Lauren said she was:  
shocked beyond belief … You’d think that the correct behavior for a regional 
manager would be to be aligning with the corporate fraud group, to say, ‘hey, 
if there are employees in my region committing fraud, I need to know about 
it.’  Not going out and warning his employees and saying ‘hey, they are onto 
us!’ (laughs a little) 
Ted espoused similar astonishment at his betrayal by the very institution he trusted the 
most. He described his earlier faith in the Ministry of Defence’s willingness to listen, 
which prompted him to speak up, and his shock that this was entirely misplaced. Even 
having been through what he perceived to be unfair reprisals for merely speaking out 
about corruption in the organization he loved, he nonetheless positioned himself as an 
old-fashioned ‘military man’. Despite his betrayal by the military, Ted holds strongly 
to its values:  
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I come from a military background. Okay. The reason people fight in a trench 
on the battlefield is because I protect you and you protect me and we have a 
common understanding about ‘I will not betray you; I will not run away; I will 
stand and look after you; and you will do the same for me.’ … Beneath that is 
an understanding of trust. … And when you betray that trust you undermine 
the whole structure of society. 
In describing ‘who they were’, others articulated their positions as comprising a 
strong commitment to the old, traditional ideals of their profession (Table 2), even 
where these ideals had been seriously compromised by the corruption they witnessed.  
Finally, some whistleblowers portrayed their current absence from their profession, 
having been blacklisted for speaking out, as a significant loss to the profession itself. 
As Edward, a very senior executive at a US bank who spoke up about mistreatment of 
his colleagues through risks to their health and safety, along with a toxic sales culture 
that encouraged customers to purchase mortgages they could not repay, noted:  
How is it that I who did everything right for the entirety of my career—how 
am I unemployable when I was so eminently employable? How could [my 
whistleblowing] be regarded as a bad thing? I still don’t get it. …. Especially 
because I’m about to be an empty-nester. I should be doing my best work for 
some company now. 
By citing oneself as a loss to the professional, one is discursively positioned firmly 
within this wider milieu. In these various ways, the ideals of the profession in which 
they worked informed people’s articulations of both, their positions and descriptions 
of what prompted them to speak up. Ted, Lauren, Edward and many others drew on 
professional ideals to articulate ‘who they really are’. 
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Outsider 
Many people represented themselves as having been an ‘outsider’ within their 
organization and specific work group, even prior to speaking out. They described how 
this gave them a different perspective on organizational practices including corrupt 
ones. In most cases, people were relatively new arrivals to their position when they 
spoke out, which meant that it had been necessary to ask a lot of questions: 
I asked a lot of questions because I was the newcomer, and I wanted to find 
out how the place worked. And when I ultimately learned the answers, I 
thought, ‘Well, it can't work this way. This is against the law, so I tried to fix 
it.’ So, it was all quite innocent from my [side] … (Edward) 
Others cited their training and background as having been different to others in their 
organization: Anita, who spoke out about corruption at the United Nations was 
educated at an ‘elite’ law school unlike many of her colleagues while Ted was 
somewhat of an anomaly in his private sector contracting firm due to his military 
background. Others including Tom, another financial services whistleblower, 
described experiencing frequent changes of environment and schools in their youth 
(Table 2). In addition to having been different as a result of training or experience or 
life trajectories, thus seeing things in a different way and perhaps more easily spotting 
irregularities and unethical practices, this outsider status also suggests that they had 
not yet been inculcated into the norms of their specific group. A strong sense of group 
cohesion and loyalty is one of the biggest obstacles to speaking out (Heffernan, 2011; 
Janis, 1972). 
Loyal employee  
Even where they described themselves as outsiders, for many a significant sense of 
organizational loyalty marked people’s articulated subjectivities. This manifested in a 
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number of ways: people espoused a deep commitment to improving their 
organization, and noted that this was what prompted disclosures about perceived 
wrongdoing. Edward for example describes a passion to ‘defend and protect’ his 
organization. It is, he notes:  
[…] the people who are most loyal [that whistleblow] and say, ‘Look, we want 
to preserve, protect, and defend the reputation of the place, and we don't want 
you to compromise the reputation. We think we can build a better company’.  
He is among this group:  
My primary objective in doing what I did was—you know, I’m sort of a 
performance-improvement architect. That’s what I do for a living.  
Within this, it is clear that his sense of self is tied up in how the organization is 
perceived, both by himself but also by others. 
A second aspect of organizational loyalty emerged when people espoused positions of 
‘believer’ in their organization’s willingness to correct the wrongdoing they had seen. 
They presented themselves as having had faith that, once the organization learned 
about the wrongdoing, it would act. Returning to Lauren, after she had been dismissed 
for speaking up about the corruption she witnessed, her company’s subsequent merger 
with a larger bank gave her hope. She described her belief that the new management 
would listen to her complaints and see the extent of the wrongdoing. They would 
surely then get rid of the people that had facilitated the systematic mortgage fraud she 
witnessed, re-hire her, and ‘fix everything’.  
I thought that they wouldn’t dare you know, do anything with [the new bank] 
… I just thought, ‘[the new bank] is here, they can’t do this stuff anymore’. 
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Lauren explained how she clung to that faith and how difficult it was to ‘accept’ the 
corruption in her company. She later learned that the new management were not only 
aware of the fraud, but were happy to let it continue.  
Four years and a gazillion depositions later I learned that [they] just embraced 
that whole thing. I mean, they were already having to stave off the regulators 
for stuff that they were doing.  
It was, she reflected, a case of ‘rose-colored glasses’:  
I thought they were you know, some kind of knight in shining armor and it 
turned out they were you know … (voice breaks) 
Ted also spoke about the difficulty of accepting the layers of systemic corruption, the 
silencing of those who oppose it, and in his case, the UK government’s long-lasting 
complicity (Table 2). Eric, a senior risk executive at a well-known UK bank who 
highlighted a toxic sales culture before being dismissed for doing so, described a 
similar faith in his organization. He didn't realize the risk he encountered by speaking 
out, he notes: 
Maybe I was good at all other forms of risk management except for risk 
management of my own personal circumstances. I felt very strongly that if I 
was able to demonstrate through evidence, through the rigorous audits that we 
were carrying out, that things were going wrong, that I would be listened to. 
Even if I wasn't listened to by the executive, that I would be listened to by the 
non-executives, and also the [regulator]. 
As do others, Lauren and Eric constructed themselves as having been loyal to their 
organization in the past, an earlier position of faith that was based on flawed 
assumptions. Many discussed how they had been “too naïve" prior to whistleblowing, 
22 
wrongly believing that their disclosures would be welcomed and treated in the spirit 
of improving the organization. 
Finally, it appears that this portrayed position of loyal subject involves significant 
emotional investment. This is evident from the excerpts above, and further with UN 
whistleblower Anita, who likened her position in the organization to one within a love 
relationship: 
See, the point… is that I was bound and determined to work at the 
[organization] because I believed in its mission on paper. You know how 
when a woman gets involved with a man and, you know, refuses to see that 
person for the way they are, they've fallen in love with their idea of that 
person? That was my relationship with [organization].  
Claire who spoke out about patient abuse in the Irish care service, echoed this sense:
I was so disappointed because ...I was so looking forward. I had done my 
Masters [dissertation] on this organization. I thought these were just, like, my 
heroes.
Many respondents positioned themselves as having felt passionately about the 
organization for which they worked, noting that this fuelled their faith that the 
wrongdoing would be addressed. Overall therefore, a self-positioning of having been, 
in the past, a loyal organizational subject, invested in an organizational ideal, was 
clear throughout our interviews. 
‘Involuntary’ discloser 
Even as people cited loyalty, or professional idealism, as prompting their disclosures, 
they frequently described themselves as involuntarily compelled to do so: as having 
had ‘no other choice’. George, an audit professional, discovered that ordinary people 
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who had invested pensions in his bank would not receive their due after a merger. He 
recalled feeling that he had no option but to blow the whistle, it ‘never occured to 
him’ to do otherwise: 
In my experiences, whistle blowers are people who make a moral choice and it 
probably never occurs to them to make any other choice because this is the 
right thing to do and therefore I will do it.  
Gary, who unearthed his bank’s role in supporting money laundering on the part of 
international drug lords, discussed this compulsion, describing it as ‘instinctive’: 
Sometimes you do things you don't want to do; you just instinctively do what 
you're doing. If you think about it ... well, if you really analyzed it, you 
wouldn't necessarily do it. Actually, I can't sit in front of people and hold 
myself out to be some kind of super moral crusader. I don't see myself as that. 
Gary felt that he cannot be considered heroic, because he was simply compelled to 
speak up and, like George, was unable to act differently. This echoes Claire’s 
recollection of an irresistible need to speak up, not least because of the feelings of 
guilt she anticipated, if she stayed silent about the abuse of mental health patients she 
had witnessed: 
I would have paid another price if I had kept my mouth quiet. That's the point. 
I would have had to pay a price in a different sense. 
As with other participants, Claire, Gary and George presented themselves as 
involuntary subjects of disclosure, compelled to speak out in the face of wrongdoing. 
They constructed themselves as having faced a ‘choiceless choice’ (Alford, 2007, see 
also Alford, 2001; Contu, 2014; de Maria, 2008; Scheuerman, 2014), indicating a 




Our data explored the ways in which whistleblower subjectivities were constructed in 
relation to their organizations, in the interview setting. As both Butler (2004) and 
Foucault (2001) note, to give an account of oneself in such a way is always to take a 
risk, referring to something that is never self-identical at a given point in time 
(Loizidou, 2007, p. 72). In the above we see the complex and sometimes conflicted 
nature of whistleblower subjectivity and the various positions comprising it. We draw 
upon our analysis of the data to propose a different conception of whistleblower 
subjectivity, focusing on the meaning of risk and the reinvention of the whistleblower 
as a truth-telling subject, in order to re-theorize this concept through passionate 
attachments to organizational and social norms and values.
Whistleblowing as self-constitution 
Recent research into organizational whistleblowers depicts people’s ‘self-
constitutions’ as parrhesiastic subjects. These comprise ideas of having attempted to 
instigate change by speaking up from a relatively low status about what one feels to 
be true and right, of being formed by the experience and emerging anew as a ‘subject 
of truth-telling’. This construction enables the whistleblower to be ‘as he (sic) ought 
to be and wishes to be’ (Foucault, 2005, p. 318-9). Certainly, we found this to be the 
case in our study, with people compelled to adopt such a position. Examining this in 
more depth we encountered fractured, diverse subjectivities whose aspects ranged 
from loyal employee to involuntary discloser, for example. Whistleblowers often 
described themselves as simply ‘doing their job’ rather than performing a heroic deed. 
In this way, we offer an in-depth empirical account of whistleblower subjectivity as a 
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complex and multiple phenomenon, with people moving back and forth between 
positions. 
However, in doing so, our in-depth study yielded further insights into the constitution 
of whistleblower subjectivity that both build upon but also challenge existing 
understandings of this topic. These relate both to the risk involved but also the 
narrative of self-reinvention inherent to the transitionary experiences depicted. 
Authors describe the parrhesiastic whistleblower as adopting a position of 
independence, having engaged in ethical truth-telling as ‘an action which is [both] 
risky and free’ (Weiskopf & Willmott 2013, p. 471). Indeed, from the outside, it is 
easy to imagine the free moral whistleblower who risks everything to speak out, but 
our empirically-driven analysis suggests that the situation is more complex.  
Risk
Scholars depict whistleblowers as fully aware of, and deliberately taking, risks in 
speaking out, moreover noting that embracing the threat of ‘costly consequences’ 
including risks to their livelihood, is an ‘an essential characteristic’ of of the position 
of parrhesiastic truth-teller (Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 651, see also 
Andrade, 2015; Mansbach, 2011; Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013). Examining their 
accounts, it is true that most of our participants do appear to construct themselves as 
subjects who have ‘risked everything’ in speaking out against corruption in their 
organizations. However, it is not clear that this construction involves making a clear 
and fully-conscious decision to do so, at any specific point. In people’s articulated 
self-constitutions, rather than risk-takers, we find professional idealists and loyal 
organizational adherents. We find people describing a lack of awareness of the danger 
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they courted and the consequences of disclosing. In hindsight, they note that their 
actions were indeed dangerous to themselves but this was not foreseen. Rather the 
dangers appeared to unfold, and escalate, over an extended period of time (see also 
Martin & Rifkin, 2004; Rothschild, 2013, p. 659; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). Our 
respondents describe how their trust in their organization and belief that it would take 
action rather than dismiss their disclosures and shun them, played an important role in 
their decisions to speak up. The idea of the truth-teller subject who is fully aware of 
what is to come, and speaks out regardless, appears unfounded in relation to these 
accounts. Instead we find misplaced faith in the ideals of the profession—assuming 
that others would also subscribe to these and be similarly shocked at clear 
transgressions—but also in ideals of the organization, when people discuss their faith 
that senior management would address the wrongdoing once it became apparent. 
These whistleblower subjectivities were intertwined with professional and 
organizational attachments; people describe how they expected to be listened to and 
perhaps praised for this service. This points to the value of in-depth empirical study of 
whistleblowers; while people in this position might ‘look like’ extreme risk-takers 
from the outside, this may not be the case. While we do not deny the risk and courage 
involved in speaking up (in fact, our experience with whistleblowers was truly 
humbling and turned us to committed supporters of their cause), the findings 
presented in this study show how people account for themselves as having never 
imagined they would risk their jobs and wellbeing, face divorce or lose their friends 




Scholarly conceptions of the whistleblowing subject as a free and autonomous 
individual persist (Contu, 2014). This subject is painted as one who steps outside of 
their institutional role and frees themselves from the norms they have previously 
embodied (Mansbach, 2009; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016). Weiskopf & 
Willmott (2013) cite Foucault in describing the ‘“self-possession and self-
sovereignty” of the parrhesiastic whistleblower, which enables him or her to 
overcome obstacles, such as fear and co-option by other forces. The whistleblower 
effectively “invents” him/herself as a responsible self in practices of decision making 
[…] opening up historically sedimented identities’ (ibid. p. 475). This idea of freely 
‘reinventing’ oneself is echoed by others (Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016), who 
invoke a radical break from the organization. Alford’s (2007) well-known depiction 
of the whistleblowing act as a compulsion to be free, is followed up by Weiskopf and 
Tobias-Miersch who describe how Strack came to be defined and to define himself as 
a whistleblower, which lead to ‘not only to a dis-identification with a given 
organizational identity, but also to a counter-identification with alternative discourses 
and to the affirmation of a new identity in which notions of public interest become 
central’ (2016, p. 661).
In the case of our study we saw various instances of such ‘self-constitution as an 
ethical subject’, whereby people appeared to engage in a reinvention that relinquished 
previous ties to dominant forms of power including their organizations. Was this 
however depicted as the act of freedom that others suggest? From our data, it appears 
not. While people such as Gary, Eric and Lauren espoused cynical and free subject 
positions, when juxtaposed against the remainder of their complex articulations it 
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appears that this freedom was somewhat constituted by the organization, as we 
elaborate next.  
Whistleblowers, passion and organization 
For participants, the organization remained a deeply-constitutive aspect of their 
emergent subjectivity as whistleblower. This connection was clear in the discursive 
positions people adopted, but crucially it was evident in the passionate, desiring 
attachments to aspects of organization and profession that marked their self-
constructions, and this was apparent when whistleblowers shared their experiences. 
For example, Lauren’s voice breaks as she recalls the faith she used to have in her 
bank. Moreover, at the outset of the interview, occurring some seven years after her 
firing, she notes how: ‘it still gives me so much anxiety…in reliving it’; she has not 
moved on. Anita describes herself as having been in love with her organization, while 
Claire’s admiration for her ‘hero’ managers remains. Edward described a passion for 
‘preserving, protecting and defending’ his organization. Perhaps more powerfully, a 
deep attachment to profession also survives to the present-day articulations of what it 
is to whistleblow, with Lauren evoking a ‘love’ for fraud, Edward describing a desire 
to be ‘doing his best work’ and Eric presenting himself as a true subject of 
(traditional) banking values. Ostensibly moved on, participants appear to be 
connected in a deeper way to the entities that have effectively cast them out and 
caused them pain; their former workplaces and their former professions.  
Emerging from the data is a picture of whistleblowers who are ‘passionately invested’ 
in organizational and professional subject positions, despite acknowledging the pain 
(Butler, 1997) that these have caused them in the past and continue to do so today. 
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The ties are not easily shaken. Even as Lauren for example attempts to invoke an 
independence from her former workplace, these efforts break down in emotive 
utterances. The values of the military ethos of service, loyalty and trust continued to 
guide Ted’s actions when he tried to publicize his case widely in the media and 
through the whistleblowers organization he founded and led. Despite having been let 
down by the Ministry of Defence, the very organization that had instilled them, these 
values persisted.  
It appears that aspects of profession and organization that whistleblowers end up 
denouncing are more difficult to cast off than we assume. As Butler notes, the 
emergence of the subject in social life is inextricably intertwined with desires for 
recognition in relation to dominant discourses: as social subjects, we are passionately 
attached to achieving this acknowledgement within the terms of powerful norms that 
constitute us socially. Indeed others have explored how such attachments to 
organization can persist in a range of settings (Riach et al., 2016), from NGOs 
(Kenny, 2010) to health care (Fotaki, 2014). Here it appears that whistleblowing 
subjects are no different; desires for organizational and professional recognition 
persist.  
Theoretical implications 
Returning to literature on organizational whistleblowing therefore, we propose a 
different conception of whistleblower subjectivity: rather than subjects of risk, and 
free reinvention, we find individuals who remain passionately attached to 
organizational and professional norms and values even where they cause them hurt. 
This contributes to existing understandings in a number of ways.  
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Studies portray the reinvention of the whistleblower self as, on the one hand, 
influenced by societal norms; the parrhesiast’s subjectivity is ‘formed and shaped, yet 
not determined, by the discursive context in which it emerges and by the normative 
frame that governs it’, as noted above (Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016, p. 648, see 
also Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013). More often, however, this ‘re-identification’ tends 
to be described as somewhat free of norms, driven only by one’s own ‘calling’ or 
desire (Contu, 2014). Yet, doing so in a simplistic manner based on secondary 
accounts or high-level abstract theorizing risks glorifying such practice and 
overlooking the ways in which whistleblowing can be influenced by a sense of 
organizational and professional duty. This approach therefore tends to ignore the 
complex and nuanced ways in which subjects, and researchers, are deeply embedded 
in the organizations that are an important presence in our lives. For this reason, 
organizational whistleblowers are arguably different to the kinds of parrhesiastic 
subjects appearing in other contexts who might find themselves less attached, freer 
and more likely to risk all. 
Others note the intertwining of parrhesiastic practice and organization, finding that 
the boundary between organization and whistleblower-parrhesiast can be somewhat 
blurred. Andrade (2015) for example uses critical complexity theory to argue that ‘the 
identities of the corporation and its corporate members including the whistleblower-
parrhesiastes, are ‘co-terminous […] the whistleblower is firmly […] fundamentally 
part of the organization’ (p. 321). The whistleblower is an essential part of the 
organization, constitutive to it (see also Alford, 2001). We turn this on its head, 
arguing that the organization is deeply embedded within the whistleblower-self, just 
as the reverse is true. In addition, scholars have referred to the influences of various 
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forms of ‘moral authority’ in acts of whistleblowing (see for example Weiskopf & 
Tobias-Miersch, 2016), but tend not to elaborate upon the nature of this attachment. 
Here we propose that framing the ongoing constitution of subjectivity on the part of 
whistleblowers through a lens that draws on Butler but also Foucault, provides a 
valuable contribution. It explains how, from the outside, whistleblowers may appear 
to be free, but insidious forms of authority remain.  
Overall this suggests that perhaps the ‘rationality of whistleblowing’ (Contu, 2014, p. 
403) is not singular, or at least not as singular as might have been thought, but rather 
is founded in complex psychic structures of recognition, of which the organization 
and the professional norms it is meant to embody are key. The interpretation of 
parrhesia through the Foucauldian lens that most organizational scholars working on 
whistleblowers’ subjectivity seem to adopt, is a romantic notion, and it is tempting to 
apply this to organizational whistleblowers. Rather than a fearless risk-taker who 
takes a sudden leap forward into an unknown future and re-invents herself 
accordingly, here we see a faithful organizational subject, embedded in affective 
attachments to the organization itself and the ideal it represents, even years later. Put 
differently, without diminishing their service to society, or undermining their courage 
and resolve, what sets apart the whistleblower from other employees is the very act of 
speaking up and not his or her superhuman qualities.  
Furthermore, we acknowledge that people’s accounts were co-constructions in which 
they were compelled to speak from the position of ‘whistleblower’ when narrating 
their experiences. The affects and feelings that emerged were thus a result of this 
interaction, and this was not only on the side of the interviewee. Indeed, as 
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researchers we each felt moved and affected on numerous occasions and despite 
attempts to stay in the neutral position of the interviewer, we were drawn into the 
affective atmosphere arising during the conversations, responding to the articulations 
of our interlocutors. It was for example difficult not to share people’s incredulity at 
the depth of corruption occurring in well-known organizations (ranging from the NHS 
to global banks), and the lengths to which organizations could go in order to retaliate. 
Reflecting on our role in these interactions, we were surprised at the strength of the 
affective ‘pull’ this had on us. This suggests that we too found it difficult to accept the 
depth of wrongdoing, indicating our inadvertent interpellation by organizational 
power, but it also highlights the dynamics underpinning our empathy with courageous 
whistleblowers who generously shared their painful experiences with us even beyond 
the duration of our various projects.  
These observations have implications for empirical research into whistleblowing; an 
attentiveness to passionate attachments can help us to begin to apprehend the 
‘fundamental sociality of embodied life’ (Butler, 2004, p. 22). Displays of emotion 
and affect by researchers as well as the research subject occur in the relational space 
that is created between them, and these can help us understand the role of affect in 
subjection to power (Butler, 2004, p. 235). Having listened to these excruciating and 
painful accounts we could not help experiencing our respondents’ feelings albeit 
vicariously and reflecting upon our own attachments in respective situations. These 
attachments thus pertain both to those who engage in whistleblowing and those who 
research them.  
33 
Practical implications 
This study challenges existing interpretations of organizational whistleblowers while 
building upon them to develop a more nuanced understanding of such experiences in 
action. The importance of this is not simply theoretical however. Conceiving of the 
whistleblower subject as courageous risk-taker who is somewhat free and autonomous 
from the influence of others and the social invokes a whistleblower-self who is both 
super-human in their autonomy, and unrealistically fearless in the face of risk. It does 
not relate to the subjects we encountered (see also Brown, 2017). Most 
whistleblowers are not particularly unusual; they are ‘ordinary people’ albeit 
courageous ones (Contu, 2014; Mansbach, 2009). It is not easy to empathize with 
extraordinary, ‘super-human’ heroes. Nor is it easy to see them as vulnerable and 
deserving of help. Currently society provides little if any assistance for those whose 
careers, families and incomes are destroyed in the ‘afterlife’ of whistleblowing 
(Smith, 2014). Even if they are cherished and their courage is admired by the public, 
few realize the true cost of whistleblowing and the need for help. To conceive of the 
whistleblower-parrhesiastes as fearless and self-driven is to promote the idea that 
supports to assist people in speaking out, such as legal protections and organizational 
speak-up systems are unnecessary, as if parrhesia will simply emerge spontaneously 
because of the ‘exceptional courage’ of those who engage in it (Brown, 2017). To 
portray them as such is therefore to deter would-be resisters. 
Conclusion 
We contribute to studies of speaking out in organizations by offering a theoretical 
framing that highlights the passionate nature of whistleblower subject constructions 
that are entangled in discourses of professionalism but also in attachments to the 
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organization that has rejected and retaliated against them. To appreciate the 
challenging nature of this position an attentiveness to these organizational 
attachments is essential. Applying a somewhat heroic label to the whistleblower, in a 
simplistic manner, can undermine the original disclosure and reduce support for the 
ordinary people who engage in such actions. Our proposed conception of 
whistleblower subjectivity thus represents a fruitful development of this important 
theory within organization studies.
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Table 1: Empirical Research 
Project and Funding Organization No. of 
whistleblowers 
interviewed*
Employment sectors Dates interviews were 
conducted
1. Speaking up in financial services 
JE Safra Centre for Ethics/ Millennium Fund
15 Financial services 
including sales, 




2. What makes whistleblowing possible across 
different industries?  
British Academy/ Leverhulme Trust
22** Military, Leisure services, 





* For each project, professional experts on the topic of whistleblowing were also interviewed, including industry regulators and specialist 
lawyers (Project 1), and psychiatrists specializing in whistleblowing, regulators and advisory group leaders (Project 2). 
** Seven participants who had taken part in Project 1 were re-interviewed for Project 2. 




















the ideals of the 
profession.  
The subject is posited as an 
adherent of specified rules and 
practices including in relation 
to wrongdoing, and thus 
espouses shock when it is 
prevalent. 
This commitment prompted 
action when perceived 
wrongdoing threatened the 
subject position. 
SFO allowed the company to do an internal investigation and 
they got in a company of auditors called [Company A]. I wrote 
to the director of the SFO and said "are you aware that the 
previous auditors of the company were [Company A] before 
[current auditors]? Are you aware that we have now traced the 
payments back over 30 years to when Company A were the 
auditors during that period? And therefore do you think that the 
conclusions you are going to be given by the so-called 
independent investigation are going to be truly independent and 
truly objective because, effectively, they will be rubber stamping 
their own mis-auditing over the previous years. [Richard] 
The essence of a bank is prudence. You have a fiduciary duty to 
your customer... Taking bets with other people’s money doesn’t 
fit within the definition of banking. A firm must act with 
integrity; a firm must act with due skill, care and diligence. A 
firm must have adequate systems and controls... A firm must pay 
due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly 
[Edward] 
41 
Committed to the ‘old’ (pre-
1980s) values of banking, its 
traditional social and 
community value. 
When I was a kid, bankers were like the paragons of ethics, you 
know, because it was all community banks. They didn’t have 
this—banks couldn’t cut across state lines then in the 50s and 
60s. A banker was your friend. And now, the bankers are just 
trying to rip you off. [Eddie] 
Subjects are described as a 
loss to the profession, if they 
have been forced to resign or 
have been dismissed as a 
result of disclosure. This is 
due to the loss of their skills 
and commitment. 
To be a successful money-laundering reporting officer (MLRO) 
these days, you have to know which questions not to ask… 
Banks don’t want MLROs with any skills, experience, or the 
independent knowledge to be able to stand up to the commercial 
people and say, “You can’t do that!” [Gary] 
42 
Outsider Subject is 
constituted as 




Subject is new to the 
organization, or comes from a 
different background.  
Therefore they espouse a 
position free of cultural norms 
pertaining to the new context, 
but also a new way of looking 
at a problem. 
[I was] lucky enough to have had an elite training. I went to Yale 
Law School so that gave me – I wouldn't say an arrogance – but 
that gave me a feeling of entitlement. [Anita] 
Well, I come from a military background. Okay. The reason 
people fight in a trench on the battlefield is because I protect you 
and you protect me and we have a common understanding about 
“I will not betray you; I will not run away; I will stand and look 
after you; and you will do the same for me.” …Beneath that is 
an understanding of trust. ….And when you betray that trust you 
undermine the whole structure of society. 
…I went to the MoD here in England and I wrote a paper, a 
proper staff paper, a military paper, not an academic paper...And 
I was a colonel in the army, a staff officer in the MoD, so I know 
how to write a military report. I took it to the MoD and said 
"read that and do something about it”. [Ted] 
Loyal employee Subject is 
positioned as 
very loyal to 
their 
organization. 
Committed to improvement: 
Subject is described as 
speaking up from a desire to 
right the wrongdoing and 
improve their organization. 
And I was out there in their face, nicely, gently. It’s my job to 
tell people where there’s a better way to do it; a higher quality 
way; a lower cost way; a more ethical way. That’s my job…. my 
primary objective was, “Hey, you guys stop doing this. Start 
doing the antithesis. I won’t say anything about it. Let’s just 
work together and let’s have you pursue quality, not quantity” 
[Edward] 
43 
Believer in the organization’s 
desire to correct the 
wrongdoing: Subject as 
faithful to the idea that the 
organization will act, once 
they have alerted it to the 
wrongdoing . 
I gave [information about the wrongdoing] to the MoD believing 
still at the time that they would be honest in dealing with me, 
and honest in what they were going to do with the information. I 
still didn’t believe at that point in time that they knew about [the 
corruption]… I didn’t realize the MoD would betray me. I didn’t 
realize that a man I’d known for 20 years who was a brigadier 
would choose to obey the orders of the MoD not be honest and 
open and say “Ted, I’ll give you a day. Get out because I’ve got 
to give this up” [Ted].  
When I gave them the feedback I thought they’d say thanks. And 
I thought that would be it. I didn’t know that [I would be singled 
out]. [Eddie].  
Subject as emotionally 
invested in the organization. 
[My whistleblowing experience] still gives me so much anxiety 
when um…. in reliving it. [Lauren] 
[Upon realizing that his organization was trying to isolate and 
scapegoat him]: And I broke down. I cried. It happened two or 
three times over the next week. You know, the children ring up, 
“Hi daddy, are you all right?” I remember talking to [name] my 
oldest and saying “No, I’m not. I’m in bits”. And I just, again, I 
broke down and cried. I’m not the type of person who does that.
And they really… they almost got me. They almost got me. 
Psychologically they almost got me. I think it had been working 
















Somebody had to do it… I don't want to be going in twenty 
years' time, thirty years' time, look back and wish I had done 
something [Mary] 
It just wasn’t right… I’ve got a story to tell… we’ve got to do it 
[Lauren] 
